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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Let me say at the outset, that I think there is much profit to be had in argumentation 
theorists looking at visual aspects of argumentative messages and non-verbal 
contributions to argumentative activities. But I also think that resistance to that idea 
in some quarters of the field is understandable, because it is not altogether clear 
how we ought to be talking about the role of the visual in argumentation. I myself 
have written about visual aspects of argumentation, and my paper at this conference 
continues that interest (Jacobs, 2000; 2006; 2013). But I haven’t talked about any of 
this as ‘visual argument’ or ‘visual argumentation.’ And that is because I share with 
skeptics some unease with that way of talking. Tseronis’s (2013) paper goes some 
distance in relieving my unease. He shows that it is possible to talk in clear and 
insightful ways about what gets communicated by using visual materials and how 
that works. He certainly offers some compelling and articulate interpretations.  
 My unease with talking about ‘visual argument’ is also relieved some by 
Tseronis’s insistence on looking at the use of visual materials and their form of 
presentation. He points us to just where we ought to be looking. We ought to be 
looking at the pragmatics of communication and the functions of communicative 
elements. Looking in this way at visual materials avoids the kind of mistakes that led 
semiotics into a dead end. We ought not to be looking at visual images as though 
there were some parallel to be found to the properties of a linguistic code. There is 
nothing like semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology or lexical units in the 
domain of visual imagery. What conventionalization and standardization there is 
looks much more like the conventionalization of traffic lights or the danger calls of 
vervet monkeys.  
Looking at the level of pragmatics and talking in terms of use lets us see a 
parallel to language use—probably because the same principles of communicative 
rationality are at work. An emphasis on pragmatic functions promises a principled 
account of how visuals are used to communicate and how visuals can be used to 
perform the functions that they do. Now, Tseronis mentions no such principles in 
own his analysis (e.g., Gricean or Relevance theoretic principles of implicature: 
Grice, 1975; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1995), but his analyses 
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of particular cases are generally compatible with that kind of exposition. How, 
exactly, to apply principles of pragmatics is not exactly obvious, but that’s what 
makes for interesting and challenging puzzle solving. The kind of analysis that 
Tseronis provides also makes rather obvious the parallel between the functions of 
visual form and content and the functions of linguistic figures and tropes of the sort 
that have been central to the study of rhetorical style. I have my doubts that these 
are properly called communicative functions. At least, it is not clear to me that 
figures and tropes are communicative in the sense that the field of pragmatics thinks 
of communication—as reflexively intended, openly presented information in the 
sense that Grice (1989) talks about non-natural meaning or that Sperber and Wilson 
(1995) think about ostensive indications or that Goffman (1959) refers to 
information given as opposed to information given-off.  
But the problem in calling this communicative is really a problem with 
theories of pragmatics and their general failure to come to grips with what Austin 
(1975) would have called the perlocutionary effects of language. This is particularly 
a problem when the actor strategically designs those effects. But such cases are not 
the fully communicative paradigm cases that pragmatics points to when discussing 
either speaker meaning or sentence meaning or illocutionary force. Just because a 
communicative act evokes meanings does not mean that the act means what it 
evokes. In this respect, I think Davidson (1978) is right on target in his theory of 
metaphor. So, by pointing to a parallel between the functions of visual materials and 
the functions of figures and tropes, Tseronis winds up pointing out, for me at least, 
that none of this is all that well understood. Simply because we have long-standing 
lists, categories and systems of classification doesn’t mean that we have real 
understanding of what is classified or how what is listed works (see Fahnestock, 
2011, for a recent insightful analysis). So, the direction that Tseronis takes is one 
where we all should look, but we should take a look with our eyes open.  
 
2. PROBLEMS WITH VISUAL ARGUMENT  
 
But I am still uneasy, especially with the ongoing debate that Tseronis reviews over 
whether or not there is something that can be properly called “visual argument.” My 
unease is more than a niggling concern with the proper usage of terms. And it is 
certainly not a rearguard action meant to prevent change in the traditional contents 
of the analyst’s toolbox or in the kinds of materials the analyst works with. Please do 
not take what I am about to say in that way. Pretty clearly, the visual and the non-
verbal in general play an important role in the way that argumentative messages are 
conveyed and the way that argumentative activity is conducted. And, also pretty 
clearly, the standard package of concepts and models that argumentation theorists 
have relied on to analyze and assess arguments is ill suited to the task of addressing 
the visual and the non-verbal. Promoters of the study of visual aspects of 
argumentation are correct to claim that the visual should not be ignored. And they 
are correct to claim that it cannot be reduced to the linguistic without serious 
distortion. But, by insisting that attention be given to the visual and that it be 
assimilated into the study of argumentation, advocates risk forgetting what makes 
an argument an argument and why an academic interest in argumentation exists in 
SCOTT JACOBS 
 3 
the first place. Even in the examples that Tseronis discusses, there are cases where I 
just can’t find anything that can be properly called an argument. In the Guardian ad, 
for example, I am not sure what is being claimed or what, exactly, is the argument 
for that claim. Does the double-sided picture show that there are two sides to the 
issue of women in the military? Does it show that the Guardian sees two sides to the 
issue? If that is the claim, how is the picture different from an eye-catching 
illustration? If that is the argument, what does it argue for? If the arguments are 
verbally explicit, how exactly do the visual materials function with respect to them? 
If the arguments are not explicitly present in the written material, does the way that 
visual materials operate differ from the way that pragmatics has ordinarily 
discussed “context” (admittedly, too often as just a synonym for “magic”)? And if the 
written material does not carry the weight of presenting the argument, are we sure 
there is an argument at all? Simply because we all are familiar with the arguments 
and claims and counterclaims regarding women in the military does not mean that 
they have been made by the ad – or even reported by the ad. Because we are 
familiar with them, they don’t have to be.  
So, why, when we talk about visual argument, do things so easily get all 
balled up? What is it that makes the very idea of visual arguments so controversial 
and the characterization of any particular visual display as a visual argument so 
difficult to pin down? Let me simply mention some sticky issues.  
First, the terms ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’ have ordinary language 
meanings, and that ought to be respected. For example, argumentation does not 
occur unless arguments are put forward or in some other way made a matter of 
active orientation. And if there is an argument in play, that means you can answer 
certain kinds of basic questions: What is the argument? What does that argument 
prove? These are not technical questions invented by academic specialists. And 
those questions can only be answered by articulating linguistic propositions. If you 
can’t answer those questions, you don’t have an argument. And if you don’t have an 
argument—an argument that is at least in play somehow—then you don’t have 
argumentation either. And if you don’t have an argument in the sense of its plain 
language meaning, one has to ask, why call it an argument? Why not use another 
term that captures what you do mean? When we misdescribe visuals as arguments 
we lose track of both what is essential to argument and what is going on in the 
visuals. When language goes on holiday, no one profits.  
Second, there is no such thing as visual argument—not as a contrast to verbal 
argument. There are visual aspects of arguments, visual cues to arguments, visual 
framing of arguments, uses of visual material to convey arguments, but the phrase 
‘visual arguments’ is a misusage of language. It is a misusage based, I think, on an 
equivocation in the contrast between the terms visual and verbal. When we talk 
about verbal argument, what we mean is argument in the form of language, and that 
includes cases where the language itself is explicit and direct, but also where it is 
implicit, indirect, or implicated or otherwise enthymematic. The common, essential 
feature is the expression of propositions, i.e., informational content that carries a 
truth-value and a logical form. This is why, for example, Pragma-Dialectics defines 
the act of making an argument that limits the speech acts to assertives (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; Jackson, 1985). When we refer to visual argument, 
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we almost always use visual in a different sense, in the sense of the medium of 
presentation. But that contrast is based on a category mistake. Verbal messages can 
be visual (think of writing, sign language) as well as auditory (spoken language) and 
even tactile (think of Braille). If visual is to be a proper contrast to verbal, it must be 
so in the sense that the visual imagery lacks some important quality of verbal signs. 
What might it lack? Propositional content; truth-value; logical structure; and very 
often the conventions or intentions that are the foundations of communicative acts. 
Any and all may be absent. In fact, visual images may express no information beyond 
themselves. Presentation is not itself communication. Drunk-tank pink may get 
prisoners to calm down, but painting a jail cell pink is not making an argument or 
claim to the effect that the prisoner should calm down. Often enough the color has 
such an effect, but not because the drunk in the tank takes it to communicate, “You 
should calm down” (cf. Alter, 2013). Not even should the drunk see that the pink 
paint must have been deliberately chosen or even that the painter would expect that 
the drunk would see so. None of this gets to the kind of meaning that is needed to 
construct an argument or a claim. (This, by the way, is why Davidson thinks the 
evocative quality of live metaphors is not part of their meaning—but should be 
thought of as ideas and inferences produced as effects in recipients.)  
There is a third sticky issue: the normative qualities of argumentation. If 
good arguments have any basic function, it is the function of justifying claims. While 
everything that justifies a claim need not be an argument, if something is an 
argument at all, it is subject to this normative standard. Likewise, contributions to 
argumentation as an activity are legitimate if they promote proper assessment of 
this function. Articulating these normative properties of argument and 
argumentation constitutes the rationale for the academic discipline of 
argumentation theory. It is an empirical fact that argument is subject to this kind of 
evaluation. But when we turn to visual argument, we seem lost at sea. The problem 
is not that visual materials lack legitimacy. The problem is that, when looking at 
visual material, we can’t yet see how to apply standards of legitimacy in a 
recognizable way. Take the cases presented by Tseronis. How do we even ask about 
the legitimacy of the way they function? Maybe principles of pragmatics can be 
brought into play here. But if we try to apply traditional conceptions of 
communicative clarity—explicitness, precision, singularity of meaning, certainty—
none seems redeemable. Take the “Music is What Matters” ad discussed by Tseronis. 
Is the picture about why you should listen to Bob Marley’s music even if you 
disapprove of his lifestyle (and presumably, the same for pictures of Keith Richards 
and Amy Winehouse)? Or is the assertion “Music is what matters” supposed to be 
taken as suggesting that you should listen to the music because it is good music and 
not because the music makes an enjoyable accompaniment to getting stoned or not 
because it is part of a rebellious lifestyle or not because it is part of what you do 
when you are a party person? Is it ambiguous? Is it vague? Does it matter? If a 
reader doesn’t get what the WWF ad means by “It’s your turn” is that a problem 
with the ad or is it the reader who has failed? I have no idea of how to answer such 
questions—but if this were a genuine argument I would know how to proceed.  
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Maybe all this should only drive us to keep trying, to think harder, to look 
deeper. As I said, these seem to be issues not just for visual imagery, but also for the 
pragmatics of communication generally.  
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